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* a fully documented version of this commentary is published in Margaret E. Beare and Tonita 
Murray, eds., Police and Government Relations: Who’s Calling the Shots? (University of 
Toronto Press, 2007)
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Two incidents help to frame the idea of police independence: 
• During Premiership of Joh Bjelke Peterson, Queensland state police 
assigned significant resources to raid Brisbane’s three universities, 
removing condom vending machines from the campuses. 
• In a British proceeding observed by criminologist Doreen McBarnet a 
young man was tried on the charge of jumping on and off a curb in a 
disorderly fashion. 
While the first illustrates the absurdity of misdirecting police resources, the second reveals the 
degree to which discretion gives life to criminal law.  The rights of citizens turn significantly on 
the discretion of police officers, Crown attorney’s or judges to intervene, arrest, charge, 
prosecute, convict – or not.   
Dr. Sossin’s contribution to this symposium usefully locates police issues within wider 
frameworks of thought about the legal regulation of discretion.  This helpfully corrects a common 
tendency to divorce questions relating to the police-politics interface from larger issues of 
constitutional governance, reducing complexly nuanced matters to the misleadingly simple 
questions of “who should be in charge” or “who should have the final say”.  Put so bluntly and in 
disregard of the larger constitutional background, it provokes responses that flow directly from 
the questioner’s assumptions as to whether “police” or “politicians” are most likely to produce 
substantively agreeable outcomes.   In reinserting constitutional principle into this otherwise 
starkly pragmatic calculation Professor Sossin provides valuable service.   “Independence”, it 
turns out, is an ancient legal term of art that suffuses the entire field of common law 
constitutionalism.    
Though it is also helpful, Professor Sossin’s emphasis on the rule of law is discomfiting.  
The idea of law sits ill at ease with a criminal justice system so shot-through with discretionary 
powers as to seemingly vanish into a mere “rule of persons”.  The awkwardness associated with 
personal exercises of discretion is accentuated in our era when the background ideology of 
managerialism vies mightily with the rule of law for our loyalty.  From the second we inherit the 
notion, famously articulated by Dicey, that no person is to be punished in body or in goods 
except for a distinct breach of law, established before the ordinary courts in the ordinary way.  
Though much criticized, this idea remains, as E.P. Thompson put it, “an unqualified human 
good”.  Managerialism’s predilection for efficiency over the values of fairness, propriety, rights, 
duties, constitutionalism or “law’s” proceduralist values reflects a culture that prizes “getting 
things done”.  The two live in inevitable tension.  They always have.  
“Getting things done” is not, however, the whole story when it comes to the management 
of a domestic armed force denoted as “police”.  It bears emphasis that police-government 
relations ought always to be constrained within the parameters of legality.  This is so not because 
efficiency in any managerial sense demands it but because the grundnorm of our civil society 
requires it.  No unlawful executive direction of police is acceptable.  It matters not how or by 
whom it is communicated, to whom it is addressed, or whether it is analytically “operational” or 
“policy” in nature.   No argument derived from efficiency concerns can justify unlawful 
instructions, orders, deployment or actions.   
Discretion muddies even these analytically clear waters.  Unlawfulness typically arises in 
one of several ways.  Police actions such as the arrest of law-abiding individuals, harassment of 
political opponents of the government, the use of unnecessary force, or turning a blind eye to the 
crimes of well connected individuals, would be clearly unlawful.  Even in such clear cases, 
however, the reality that police need to make choices as to the allocation of their resources, 
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cannot prosecute all wrong-doers, must exercise discretion, and sometimes make thoroughly 
honest mistakes, renders assessment of particular circumstances a complex, multi-faceted matter.  
What is essential is that fear or favour must never flow from political connection or influence.  
The “playing field” of law enforcement discretion must remain level. 
Beyond the realm of the blatantly unlawful, one can imagine situations in which the 
executive branch of government would wish to direct the use of otherwise lawful powers in 
situations where constitutional propriety would dictate otherwise.  It can be extraordinarily 
difficult to mark precisely where one constitutional right – freedom of expression or aboriginal 
entitlement, for example - must give way to another – the preservation of the peace, perhaps.  
Such boundaries fuzzily demarcate the frontier between lawful and unlawful police conduct.  But, 
for all their “fuzziness” they define the character of our democracy.  The “playing field” tilts 
strongly in the direction of political command any time police forces lack access to independent 
legal advice.   
Finally, a police power used in pursuit of improper goals is unlawful even if the same 
power, used in pursuit of proper goals and in closely similar circumstances, would be 
appropriate.  The pretense of proper motivation should not serve to uphold state action that is in 
substance directed to improper ends. The intent or effect of state action can render it “colourable” 
and, hence, ultra vires, and unlawful.   
Though the principle of colourablity is clear enough, its application is less so.   If 
mundane police wrong-doing is notoriously well concealed behind an all-but-impenetrable blue 
curtain, the problem is compounded where possibly inappropriate police-politician relations are 
concerned.  Institutional inertia weighs heavily against those who would challenge high level 
impropriety.  Direct evidence of what was said or done in the course of government 
communications with police is often lacking, quite possibly by design.  Witnesses can be hard to 
identify - and harder to compel.  There are few incentives encouraging willing testimony that 
runs contrary to the interest of either police or government hierarchies - that way career suicide 
lies.  The evidentiary bar to be overcome in proving the colourability of state actions in court is 
extraordinarily high and judicial habits of deference to officialdom have become well entrenched 
during the past half century.  Difficult questions are rarely put, the executive commands 
effectively infinite resources in protecting itself from effective inquiry.  Government officials 
often have more or less unreviewable ability to restrict access to precisely the evidence most 
likely to prove their colourable intent and presumptions of constitutional propriety conveniently 
prevent the drawing of logical inference in any circumstances falling short of admitted 
impropriety.    
Human nature being what it is, it seems inevitable that influential persons will wish to 
improperly influence the police.  They will want to do so for reasons of “corruption” (often no 
more ill-intended than “don’t put so-and-so through a prosecution; he’s a good guy”) or for 
reasons related to political grandstanding ranging from a sort of orchestrated “photo-op-by-cop” 
through to the tough-guy peacock displays of politicians seeking electoral advantage through 
displays of “law and order” machismo.   If the police as individuals or organizations are to rise 
above partisanship they must be demonstrably impartial (committed to Joseph’s “Queen’s 
Peace”) and enjoy a degree of structural independence that is up to the task of sustaining 
impartiality over the long term.  We should not confuse the two.  Institutional integrity can 
survive human failing but the converse is not true.  The conditions under which impartiality can 
exist is a central concern of administrative law and this too points to the need for a broad-based 
analysis of just the sort that Professor Sossins seeks to develop. 
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Finally, it bears noting that Kim Murray’s remarks at this symposium emphasized the 
importance of recognizing that the “law in the books” is often at variance with what actually 
happens.  This is a centrally important insight.   “Rights” solemnly declared at the rarefied levels 
of the Supreme Court of Canada or trial courts in Snow Drift, Northwest Territories (all courts 
are at a rarefied level) mean little if not respected in daily practice.  It is there that police – 
politician propriety is most likely to go off the rails.  To Sossin’s public law insight, then, must 
be added Murray’s measure of legal realism.  Combining the two leads, in turn, to two 
observations.  First, if they are to be effective, schemes derived from sophisticated legal analysis 
need to be translated into language both readily intelligible to politicians and constables alike and 
capable of being rendered operational in real life.  A finely expounded doctrine has little worth in 
real life if it is unintelligible to those called upon to put it into practice.  Secondly, in developing 
rules to govern the police-politician relationship, attention needs to be directed to procedural law, 
the law of evidence, and to the institutional capacities of the courts.  A legal structure incapable 
of identifying colourable intrusions upon rights that it purportedly protects has limited worth.  A 
system organized around deference to occupants of high office can hardly qualify as “legal”. 
Little in the history of police-government relations over the past three decades justifies 
complacency in these respects.  And that, as Professor Sossin’s emphasizes gives cause for 
concern about the integrity of both police and the democratic apparatus itself. 
